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Debrán L. O’Neil∗ 
D. Lance Currie∗∗ 
Alex More∗∗∗ 
The Survey period touched on a wide variety of professional liability issues, 
changing how these claims are prosecuted and resolved. In legal malpractice, the 
Texas Supreme Court opened the door for malpractice claims based on 
inadequate settlements, while the lower courts looked at whether clients are 
limited to breach of contract claims in fee disputes, clarified how legal 
malpractice claims are tolled, and explored how expert testimony in legal 
malpractice cases relates to underlying suits. The Texas Supreme Court 
continues to refine Health Care Liability Claims and the requirements for 
Chapter 74 expert reports, clarifying how to serve such reports and easing the 
burden on plaintiffs by requiring that such reports set forth only one, and not 
all, liability theories. As for director and officer liability, courts addressed 
settlements in the context of challenges to mergers by shareholders and explored 
the equitable remedies available in shareholder oppression claims. 
I.  LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
A.  SETTLEMENTS AND THE “SUIT WITHIN A SUIT” ASPECT OF LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE 
The most significant legal malpractice decision of this Survey period was the 
Supreme Court’s 7–2 ruling in Elizondo v. Krist.1 In Elizondo, the Texas Supreme 
Court affirmed a no-evidence summary judgment against two legal-malpractice 
plaintiffs because their expert witness’s affidavit testimony regarding malpractice 
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 1. Elizondo v. Krist, 415 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. 2013). 
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damages was inadequate.2 In so doing, the Supreme Court clarified its prior 
jurisprudence that such damages are “the difference between the result obtained 
[in the case at issue] and the case’s ‘true value,’ defined as the recovery that 
would have been obtained ‘following a trial’ in which the client had ‘reasonably 
competent, malpractice-free’ counsel.”3 A plaintiff need not necessarily prove 
what would have happened had the case gone to trial with competent counsel—
the accepted “suit within a suit” approach—the Supreme Court explained.4 
Instead, when a case involves an allegedly inadequate settlement, damages may 
be proven if an “expert measures the ‘true’ settlement value of a particular case 
by persuasively comparing all the circumstances of the case to the settlements 
obtained in other cases with similar circumstances. . . .’”5 Here, the Supreme 
Court found that the plaintiffs did not satisfy this alternative approach because 
of an “analytical gap” in their expert’s testimony, which rendered his affidavit 
conclusory and therefore no obstacle to summary judgment.6 
“In March 2005, an explosion occurred at the Texas [C]ity refinery of BP 
Amoco Chemical Company (BP), killing fifteen workers and injuring many 
others.”7 “Approximately 4000 claims were filed against BP, and BP settled them 
all.”8 Jose Elizondo suffered injuries but “returned to work a few days later.”9 
Nevertheless, he “claimed he continued to suffer from psychological problems,” 
and “[h]is wife, Guillermina, claimed that she too suffered, from loss of 
consortium.”10 Mr. Elizondo retained counsel, who sent a demand letter seeking 
$2 million from BP.11 BP responded by offering $50,000.12 After counsel was 
unsuccessful in persuading BP to increase its offer, Mr. Elizondo accepted the 
$50,000 and signed a release covering both himself and Guillermina.13 
Later, the Elizondos sued the attorneys, alleging that they had “failed to 
obtain an adequate settlement.”14 In defense, the attorneys filed several no-
evidence summary judgment motions, including one asserting that the 
Elizondos had no evidence of malpractice damages.15 The Elizondos responded 
with the expert affidavit of Arturo Gonzalez, an attorney who had represented 
other claimants in connection with the BP explosion.16 Gonzalez recited the 
facts of the Elizondos’ case and identified ten criteria that BP had used to 
determine the value of a case for settlement.17 Based on his “experience in the 
BP litigation,” including his knowledge of the criteria for settlement values, 
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Gonzalez opined that the Elizondos should have been able to settle for $2–3 
million.18 Nevertheless, the trial court “granted some of the summary-judgment” 
motions, and the court of appeals affirmed.19 
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s initial argument that Gonzalez’s 
affidavit was “defective” because Gonzalez only analyzed why the Elizondos’ 
“settlement was inadequate,” rather than the amount they “would have 
recovered if the case had proceeded to judgment after a trial.”20 The Supreme 
Court acknowledged that the “suit within a suit” approach—determining the 
value of success after trial—was a valid method for proving malpractice damages 
but held that it was not the only method for proving such damages.21 
Considering BP had “settle[d] all cases and not tr[ied] any to a verdict,” a 
comparison of those other settlements with the plaintiffs’ case could have 
proven malpractice damages.22 
However, the Gonzalez affidavit failed to make the requisite comparison.23 
Gonzalez had recited the pertinent settlement factors and facts, had shown that 
he had personal experience with other settlements, and had then concluded, 
based on his expertise, that the Elizondos’ settlement was inadequate.24 But he 
had not tied the facts of the Elizondos’ case to the settlement factors or to the 
other cases and the settlements therein.25 Relying on Burrow v. Arce, the 
Supreme Court held that, absent such a comparison, there was an “analytical 
gap” between the data Gonzalez purported to rely on and his proffered opinion, 
which (consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior rulings in the realm of expert 
testimony) rendered Gonzalez’s affidavit conclusory and, effectively, “no 
evidence.”26 
The Supreme Court rejected the Elizondos’ argument that Gonzalez could 
not perform the requisite comparison because the BP settlements remained 
confidential.27 The record showed that the Elizondos had “disclaimed any need 
for information regarding the amounts of [the] other settlements.”28 The 
Supreme Court also rejected the Elizondos’ final contention that their lay 
testimony created a fact issue because the requisite “analysis of settlements made 
under comparable circumstances . . . requires expert testimony.”29 
The dissent argued that the Elizondos were only required to prove that they 
sustained some damages.30 Because Gonzalez’s affidavit attested that the 
Elizondos were paid only nuisance value when the case had actual value, and 
because it recited facts that plaintiffs’ attorneys would have developed to 
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establish that the claims had merit (but were not developed here), the dissent 
believed that the Gonzalez affidavit created a fact issue sufficient to survive 
summary judgment.31 But the majority found this conclusion to be equally 
subject to the fatal “analytical gap.”32 
By not limiting recoverable damages to the “suit within a suit” approach,33 
the Texas Supreme Court left the door open to legal malpractice claims based 
on allegedly inadequate settlements. However, the Supreme Court did suggest 
that for an expert to opine on the inadequacy of a settlement, he likely must 
compare the settlement at issue to other actual settlements under similar 
circumstances in order to avoid a challenge based on an “analytical gap” in the 
expert analysis.34 
B.  IF THE UNDERLYING SUIT REQUIRES AN EXPERT, SO DOES A SUBSEQUENT 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE SUIT 
The Fifth District Court of Appeals in Dallas also addressed the necessity and 
adequacy of expert testimony in legal malpractice cases. In Kelley & Witherspoon, 
L.L.P. v. Hooper, the court held that if an underlying case required medical 
expert testimony for causation then a medical expert is required to prove 
causation in a subsequent legal-malpractice case.35 In underlying litigation, 
Charles and Jeannette Hooper hired Kelley & Witherspoon, L.L.P. to represent 
them in a personal injury case related to an automobile accident.36 The law firm 
sued the wrong party, and after repleading, the claims were ultimately dismissed 
based on limitations.37 On trial of the subsequent malpractice case—in which the 
Hoopers called an attorney expert but did not call a medical expert—the jury 
found that the Hoopers would have recovered $235,000 on the auto-accident 
case.38 The law firm appealed.39 
The court of appeals explained that “[a] legal-malpractice claim is based on 
negligence.”40 To prevail, a client “must prove that it would have prevailed in 
the underlying case but for its attorney’s negligence.”41 Kelley & Witherspoon 
argued that Texas law required the Hoopers to introduce medical-expert 
testimony to prove the causal connection between the automobile accident and 
the Hoopers’ alleged damages.42 The court first noted that there is “no Texas 
Supreme Court authority directly on point.”43 The court then reviewed its prior 
decision in Cantu v. Horany, in which it affirmed a summary judgment decision 
 
 31. See id. at 271. 
 32. See id. at 264 (majority opinion). 
 33. See id. at 270. 
 34. See id. at 262–66. 
 35. Kelley & Witherspoon, L.L.P. v. Hooper, 401 S.W.3d 841, 848–49 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
2013, no pet.). 
 36. Id. at 845. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 846. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 847. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 848. 
 43. Id. 
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in a legal-malpractice case based on a prior medical-malpractice lawsuit for lack 
of medical-expert testimony.44 The court also reviewed Rangel v. Lapin from the 
Houston First Court of Appeals, in which the court affirmed a summary 
judgment decision in a legal-malpractice case based on a prior products liability 
claim when the movant also failed to produce the required expert testimony.45 
Following Cantu and Rangel, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that “a legal-
malpractice plaintiff who contends that his attorney’s negligence caused him to 
lose a claim he otherwise would have won and collected on must adduce expert 
testimony to prove the case-within-a-case aspect of causation if that causal 
connection is beyond a lay juror’s common understanding.”46 Consequently, the 
court held that if a medical expert is needed in underlying litigation, then it is 
required in a subsequent legal malpractice suit.47 
In general, if causation requires a connection beyond a juror’s common 
understanding, expert testimony is required. The decision in Kelley & 
Witherspoon L.L.P., along with those in Cantu and Rangel, reminds litigants to 
look not only at the causal connection in the legal malpractice case, but also to 
closely scrutinize whether expert testimony was required to prove causation in 
the underlying lawsuit.48 Failure to identify the need for expert testimony can 
prove fatal to a plaintiff’s recovery.49 
C.  ECONOMIC LOSS RULE DOES NOT BAR ATTORNEY BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY CLAIMS 
In Fleming v. Kinney ex rel. Shelton, the Houston Court of Appeals for the 
Fourteenth District explored the interaction between the economic loss rule and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against attorneys when their relationship is 
governed by an engagement letter, ultimately holding that the economic loss 
rule does not bar such claims.50 The economic loss rule prevents a plaintiff from 
pursuing a negligence claim for breach of a duty created by a contract when the 
damages sought are only for the economic loss that is the subject of that 
contract.51 In Fleming, a group of plaintiffs sued their former counsel for fees 
they were charged in litigation involving prescription diet drugs.52 “A federal 
multidistrict litigation (MDL) court was designated to handle [the prescription 
diet drug] cases,” and parties could only opt out of the MDL process if they 
followed specific procedures.53 Specifically, “opt-out litigants had to establish 
 
 44. Id. (citing Cantu v. Horany, 195 S.W.3d 867, 869–70, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no 
pet.)). 
 45. Id. (citing Rangel v. Lapin, 177 S.W.3d 17, 19–20, 22–23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
2005, pet. denied)). 
 46. Id. at 848. 
 47. Id. at 849. 
 48. See id. at 847–49. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Fleming v. Kinney ex rel. Shelton, 395 S.W.3d 917, 923–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). 
 51. Id. at 923. 
 52. Id. at 920. 
 53. Id. 
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their eligibility to sue under a scientific testing program.”54 Gus Fleming and his 
law firm set up a testing program to identify potential litigants at a cost of over 
$20 million.55 Roughly 40,000 people were tested, and 8,000 litigants were 
identified.56 Fleming eventually settled the claims for 8,051 litigants for an 
aggregate $339 million.57 But Fleming’s firm then deducted the cost of setting 
up the testing program from the settlement proceeds prior to distribution.58 
Some of the litigants filed suit, alleging that Fleming breached his fiduciary 
duties by improperly charging the costs associated with testing the 32,000 people 
who were not chosen as litigants.59 
Fleming argued that disputes over fees and costs were governed by the fee 
agreements entered into by Fleming and the litigants and, as a result, that the 
economic loss rule applied and required dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim.60 Fleming argued that the fiduciary duty claim was barred because (1) the 
duty to properly charge costs arose out of the individual fee contracts, and (2) 
the damages were for the economic loss that is the subject of those contracts: 
improper fees.61 Thus, the only allowable claims were for breach of the fee 
contracts.62 The court of appeals began its analysis by noting that the Texas 
Supreme Court had not extended the economic loss rule to all tort claims.63 
Finding no controlling authority, the court of appeals then looked to public 
policy.64 The court cited other Supreme Court jurisprudence and then 
explained that contracts between a lawyer and client are closely scrutinized, 
noting that lawyers have a duty to explain all material facts to their clients.65 In 
effect, “[t]here are ethical considerations overlaying the contractual relationship” 
between a lawyer and client.66 Based on these observations, the court declined to 
extend the economic loss rule to make the existence of an attorney-client 
contract enough to exclude fiduciary duty claims.67 
What makes this case unique is the court’s willingness to treat contracts 
between an attorney and client differently than other contracts. The Supreme 
Court has not addressed this issue but hopefully will do so in the near future.68 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 921. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 923. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. at 924. 
 64. Id. at 924–26. 
 65. Id. at 925. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 924–26. 
 68. The appellate court also addressed whether violations of the Texas Rules of Professional 
Conduct give rise to private causes of action or a presumption that an attorney breached his duties. 
Id. at 931. The plaintiffs proffered an expert who opined on the relationship between the 
disciplinary rules and fiduciary duties. Id. at 929. The trial court allowed the expert to testify over 
objection, and the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 926, 929–33. Because a disciplinary rule 
violation does not create a presumption that a lawyer breached his or her fiduciary duties, the 
expert’s opinion was inherently unreliable and the admission of his testimony was error. Id. at 930–
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D.  ONE-SIDED ARBITRATION PROVISIONS 
The decision of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi-Edinberg 
provided in Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, L.L.P. v. Lopez may cause 
attorneys across Texas to reevaluate their engagement letters.69 In Royston, the 
court held that a provision requiring a client to arbitrate all claims except fee 
disputes was substantively unconscionable because it was one-sided.70 The client 
brought claims for malpractice, gross negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and 
negligent misrepresentation.71 The trial court denied the attorney’s motion to 
compel arbitration, and the attorney appealed.72 The court explained that while 
“[a]rbitration agreements are not inherently unconscionable,” “[u]nconscionable 
contracts, . . . whether relating to arbitration or not, are unenforceable under 
Texas law.”73 There are two types of unconscionability: procedural and 
substantive.74 “The test for substantive unconsionability,” the type relevant here, 
“is whether . . . the clause involved is so one sided that it is unconscionable 
under the circumstances existing when the parties made the contract.”75 
In reviewing the arbitration provision, the court explained that an attorney’s 
potential claims against a client would almost universally involve fees.76 The 
practical effect of the arbitration provision at issue was to allow an attorney to 
file a lawsuit in state court while preventing a client from doing the same.77 
Therefore, the result was one-sided and unconscionable.78 
Attorneys should review their standard engagement letters and contemplate 
whether their terms force clients to arbitrate but allow the attorney the right to 
litigate. If so, these agreements are likely subject to scrutiny under the Lopez 
court’s decision, which held they are unconscionable as a matter of law. 
E.  HUGHES TOLLING RULE 
Finally, during the Survey period several courts expanded on the Hughes 
tolling doctrine—named after the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Hughes v. 
Mahaney & Higgins79—which tolls legal malpractice claims arising out of litigation 
for the pendency of the underlying litigation and any of its subsequent 
 
33. 
 69. See Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, L.L.P. v. Lopez, 443 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi-Edinberg June 27, 2013, pet. filed). 
 70. Id. at 206. 
 71. Id. at 199. 
 72. Id. at 199–200. 
 73. Id. at 203 (citing In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Tex. 2006) (orig. 
proceeding) and quoting In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 348–49 (Tex. 2008) (orig. 
proceeding)). 
 74. Id. at 204. 
 75. Id. (citing In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 76. See id. at 206. 
 77. See id. at 205–06. 
 78. Id. at 206. The dissent characterized the majority’s ruling as holding that merely because 
the arbitration agreement arose between an attorney and client, it was one-sided. See id. at 210 
(Perkes, J., dissenting). 
 79. Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991). 
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appeals.80 The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston explored the 
pleading requirements necessary to seek tolling of malpractice claims in Haase v. 
Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrels, Agosto & Friend, L.L.P.81 The court held that 
the former client did not plead the necessary facts to assert the Hughes tolling 
rule, resulting in the partial dismissal of his claims.82 Haase involved malpractice 
claims related to underlying patent litigation.83 In the underlying case, Haase 
sued for patent infringement related to a water purification process.84 Haase 
initially engaged Abraham Watkins as his counsel, but the firm withdrew on 
April 28, 2006.85 “In March 2007, [the underlying] case proceeded to trial under 
new counsel.”86 Early on, the district court was informed that Haase never 
produced the results of the independent testing he conducted on the opposing 
party’s product, which showed different results than his patented formula.87 
“On June 28, 2007, the [district] court issued its formal sanctions decision” in 
which it struck Haase’s pleadings and imposed monetary sanctions.88 Haase 
appealed that decision, and “the appellate court reversed the order striking [the] 
pleadings” and reduced the sanctions significantly per an order dated March 24, 
2009.89 
“Haase filed a pro se action in state court against Abraham Watkins . . .” on 
March 23, 2011.90 Haase claimed that Abraham Watkins committed 
professional negligence first by labeling the test results “attorney-client work 
product.”91 “Haase contended that but for this labeling, he would not have been 
sanctioned by the district court.”92 
Beyond professional negligence, Haase “also alleged two separate causes of 
action for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract.”93 The court first 
addressed whether Haase was improperly “fracturing” his professional 
negligence claim.94 The court explained that if the alleged facts only implicate 
the attorney’s duty of ordinary care, as opposed to some other independently 
actionable duty, then the claim is for professional negligence and cannot be 
“fractured” into other claims.95 Reviewing Haase’s pleadings, the court 
concluded that Haase only complained of Abraham Watkins’ degree of care.96 
 
 80. See id. at 157. 
 81. Haase v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrels, Agosto & Friend, L.L.P., 404 S.W.3d 75 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). 
 82. Id. at 84–86, 91. 
 83. Id. at 78–80. 
 84. Id. at 78. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 79. 
 87. Id. at 78–79. 
 88. Id. at 79. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 80. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. Haase also argued that Abraham Watkins should have sued additional parties and 
pursued an additional cause of action. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 82–83. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. at 83. 
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As a result, it dismissed the separate negligent misrepresentation and breach of 
contract claims.97 
The court next addressed Abraham Watkins’ claim that any malpractice based 
on the sanctions awarded in the underlying case was barred by a two-year statute 
of limitations.98 Haase, on the other hand, argued that the Hughes tolling rule 
applied to protect his claim.99 The court began its analysis by characterizing the 
Hughes tolling rule as a plea in avoidance because “it . . . operates to deprive the 
statute of limitations of its ordinary legal effect.”100 Relying on the Texas 
Supreme Court’s decision in Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., the court of 
appeals held that the Hughes tolling rule, as a plea in avoidance, must be 
affirmatively pled.101 The court found that Haase failed to affirmatively plead 
facts to justify application of the tolling rule in either his original or amended 
petition.102 The court noted, however, that an unpleaded plea in avoidance can 
still be raised in a summary judgment response if the opposing party fails to 
object.103 
Haase’s summary judgment response made two assertions as to why 
limitations should not bar his claim: (1) “that a cause of action accrues when a 
party ‘knows or should know of the existence’ of facts giving rise to a legal 
remedy,” or (2) “that [Haase] was not ‘authorized and entitled’ to seek a judicial 
remedy (under the general accrual rule) until his federal appeal was 
exhausted.”104 The court found that “[n]either statement [wa]s a correct 
application of [the] Hughes [tolling rule].”105 Consequently, his response was not 
“sufficiently specific” to invoke the rule, especially in light of the fact that 
“Haase did not cite Hughes in his response . . . and . . . used no language to argue 
that the statute of limitations should be tolled.”106 Abraham Watkins did not 
object to the application of the Hughes tolling rule in its response, but the court 
viewed the lack of objection as support that Abraham Watkins did not believe 
the rule had been invoked.107 Because there was no tolling of limitations, the 
statute began to run on June 28, 2007, when the trial court granted sanctions, 
rather than on March 24, 2009, when the appellate court reversed in part and 
modified the sanctions order.108 Consequently, Haase’s March 23, 2011 petition 
was time barred by the two-year statute of limitations.109 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 83–89. 
 99. Id. at 84. 
 100. Id. at 85. 
 101. Id. (citing Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517–18 (Tex. 1988)). 
 102. Id. at 85–86. 
 103. Id. at 86. 
 104. Id. at 86–87. 
 105. Id. at 87. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. The court also ignored Haase’s sur-reply, which clearly invoked the rule, because it was 
served too late. Id. at 87–88. 
 108. Id. at 79, 89. 
 109. Id. The dissent disagreed, stating that while Haase’s argument may have been “imprecise,” 
the “gist” was that limitations should be “tolled during the pendency of the underlying litigation.” 
Id. at 91–92 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority did allow Haase’s remaining 
allegations—that Abraham Watkins failed to add additional parties and failed to pursue an 
additional cause of action—to proceed. See id. at 89–90. The court held that Abraham Watkins did 
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The decision by San Antonio’s Fourth Court of Appeals in Riverwalk CY Hotel 
Partners, Ltd. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. addressed a different 
aspect of the Hughes tolling rule: how close a cause of action must be related to 
litigation for the rule to apply.110 In that case, Akin Gump failed to tender 
defense of the underlying litigation to an insurance carrier.111 Riverwalk 
subsequently brought suit alleging professional negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty.112 The trial court granted summary judgment on limitations, but 
the appellate court reversed, holding that the Hughes tolling rule applied.113 Akin 
Gump argued that the “Hughes tolling rule applies only when the attorney’s 
alleged error results in litigation or directly affects the client’s position in 
pending litigation” and thus did not apply to the failure to tender defense to an 
insurance carrier.114 The court disagreed.115 It looked at two Supreme Court 
cases following Hughes—Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin and Underkofler v. Vanasek—and 
noted that the Supreme Court “did not analyze whether . . . malpractice resulted 
in litigation,” but merely whether it occurred during litigation.116 Because Akin 
Gump allegedly committed malpractice by not tendering the defense of the 
underlying litigation to the insurance carrier, it committed malpractice during 
the underlying litigation.117 Further, the “malpractice claims ar[o]se out of the 
[underlying litigation],” and “Akin Gump allegedly committed legal malpractice 
while providing legal services. . . .”118 Consequently, the Hughes tolling rule 
applied.119 
From Haase and Riverwalk, litigants learn two things. First, to invoke the 
Hughes tolling rule, a litigant must affirmatively plead the rule. Litigants should 
clearly refer to the Hughes decision and set forth facts showing why the rule 
should apply, including when the cause of action accrued and when all appeals 
of the underlying litigation were fully resolved. Second, Hughes is not so limited 
as to only toll claims for malpractice that directly affect or result in litigation. 
 
not carry its burden of showing that Haase sustained a legal injury. Id. Abraham Watkins argued 
that August 28, 2006, the day “it withdrew from the case due to irreconcilable differences,” 
“represents the last possible time in which [it] could have committed a wrongful act. . . .” Id. at 89. 
But the court explained that the date of injury controls, not the date of any wrongful act. See id. 
Because Abraham Watkins did not produce evidence showing when Haase sustained a legal injury, 
Abraham Watkins did not meet its burden to show when Haase’s causes of action accrued. Id. at 
89–90. 
 110. Riverwalk CY Hotel Partners, Ltd. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 391 
S.W.3d 229, 233–35 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). 
 111. Id. at 232. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 232, 235. 
 114. Id. at 233, 235. 
 115. Id. at 233–35. 
 116. Id. at 234–35 (referencing Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. 2001) and 
Underkofler v. Vanasek, 53 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. 2001)). 
 117. See id. at 235. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. The court also addressed Akin Gump’s fracturing defense, holding that Riverwalk had 
stated a claim separate from professional negligence in pleading that Akin Gump intentionally did 
not tender the defense to the carrier in order to collect more fees and fraudulently billed Riverwalk 
excessive fee amounts. Id. at 235–39. The court found that these two allegations were not based on 
Akin Gump’s failure to exercise due care, so they were not subsumed within the professional 
negligence cause of action. Id. at 237–39. 
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One other interesting aspect of these two cases: during the Survey period, courts 
both expanded (Riverwalk) and contracted (Haase) the application of Hughes. It 
will be interesting to see how future decisions continue to shape the rule. 
II.  MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
A.  THE SUPREME COURT CONTINUES TO DEFINE HEALTH CARE LIABILITY 
CLAIMS 
Over the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court continued to define the 
parameters of a “Health Care Liability Claim” (HCLC) and to determine which 
cases fall within the strict requirements of the Texas Medical Liability Act 
(Chapter 74).120 Chapter 74 mandates that a claimant file an expert report for 
an HCLC within 120 days after a defendant filed an original answer or else risk 
dismissal of the case with prejudice.121 The Texas Supreme Court finalized two 
opinions in 2013 further explaining how to analyze whether claims fall within 
the realm of the HCLC definition. 
Building upon its 2012 decision in Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. 
Williams,122 the Supreme Court addressed “the claims of an employee health 
care provider against his employer, also a health care provider,” in Psychiatric 
Solutions, Inc. v. Palit.123 The Supreme Court held that “the employee’s claim that 
[his] employer provided improper security of a psychiatric patient and 
inadequate safety for the employee is an HCLC,” and that the case should have 
been dismissed for failure to serve an expert report during the 120-day 
deadline.124 
Kenneth Palit, a psychiatric nurse at Mission Vista Behavioral Health Center 
(Mission Vista), “was injured at work while physically restraining a psychiatric 
patient during a behavioral emergency.”125 “Palit subsequently filed suit asserting 
a [claim] for negligence against Mission Vista. . . .”126 After the 120-day deadline 
for service of an expert report had passed, Mission Vista moved to dismiss the 
suit, arguing that (1) Palit’s claim “alleged an HCLC” and (2) Palit failed to 
comply with the statutory requirements.”127 “The trial court denied the motion 
to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed.”128 
The Texas Supreme Court looked to its holding in Texas West Oaks Hospital, 
L.P. v. Williams for guidance.129 In Texas West Oaks, the Supreme Court 
explained that, under the definition of an HCLC, “the claim or claims at issue 
must concern treatment, lack of treatment, or a departure from accepted 
 
 120. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.001−.507 (West 2011). 
 121. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2013). 
 122. Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2012). 
 123. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc. v. Palit, 414 S.W.3d 724, 724–25 (Tex. 2013). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 725. Mission Vista Behavioral Health Center was “operated by Psychiatric Solutions, 
Inc., and Mission Vista Behavioral Health Services, Inc.” Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 725–26 (citing Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2012)). 
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standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or 
administrative services directly related to health care. . . .”130 A health care 
facility’s supervision and protection of its patients, as well as its provision of a 
safe work place for caregivers, “are integral components of the . . . rendition of 
health care services.”131 Here, Palit “alleges he was injured as a result of 
improper security of a dangerous psychiatric patient because Mission Vista failed 
to provide a safe working environment and failed to make sufficient precautions 
for [his] safety.”132 “[T]hese [claims] fall under both the ‘safety’ and ‘health care’ 
components of [the] HCLC” definition because they allege both a “departure 
from the accepted standards of safety, . . . and that [Mission Vista] violated the 
standard of health care owed to its psychiatric patients. . . .”133 As such, “Palit’s 
allegations implicate a standard of care that requires expert testimony to prove . . 
. ,” and the Supreme Court had previously held that if expert medical or health 
care testimony is needed to prove or refute a claim, then such claim is a health 
care liability claim under Chapter 74.134 Because Palit’s claim qualified as an 
HCLC, Palit was required to serve an expert report within 120 days of filing 
suit.135 Palit failed to do so; therefore, the trial court should have dismissed the 
claim and granted Mission Vista reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.136 
The interpretation of the “safety” component under the HCLC definition has 
caused many disagreements between the Texas Supreme Court justices.137 
Justice Boyd wrote a lengthy concurrence in Psychiatric Solutions, Inc. v. Palit in 
which Justice Lehrman joined.138 There, the two justices disagreed “with the 
West Oaks majority’s broad construction of the ‘safety standards’ component of 
the [HCLC definition].”139 Arguing “that the Legislature intended the phrase 
‘directly related to health care’ to modify the term ‘safety’ as well as the terms 
‘professional or administrative services,’” Justices Boyd and Lehrmann advocated 
that “claims asserting a departure from accepted safety standards are only 
[HCLC] claims if the safety standards are ‘directly related to health care.’”140 
Interpreting the safety term otherwise, they argued, would “encompass” claims 
in which “a hospital visitor who is assaulted at night in the hospital’s parking lot 
. . . [claims] the hospital failed to provide adequate lighting and security. . . .”141 
This broad interpretation is “far beyond the Legislature’s stated purpose” for the 
 
 130. Id. at 725 (citing Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., L.P., 371 S.W.3d at 179–80); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West 2011). 
 131. Psychiatric Solutions Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 726 (citing Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., L.P., 371 S.W.3d at 
181 (internal quotations omitted)). 
 132. Id. at 726 (internal quotations omitted). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 727; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West 2013). 
 136. Psychiatric Solutions Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 727; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 
74.351(b) (West 2013). 
 137. See Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 727; see also Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. 
Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. 2005); Marks v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. 
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 138. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 727–31. 
 139. Id. at 727. 
 140. Id. at 729 (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. at 730. 
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statute.142 Justice Boyd went on to point out that this case could have been 
decided solely on the health care component of the HCLC definition and that 
the difficult interpretation of the “safety” component was not necessary.143 
In the short per curiam opinion of PM Management–Trinity NC, L.L.C. v. 
Kumets, the Supreme Court also addressed whether “a claim that a nursing 
home unlawfully discharged a resident in retaliation for complaints made by the 
resident’s family” qualified as an HCLC under Chapter 74.144 The Supreme 
Court held that “this retaliation claim was based on the same factual allegations 
on which one of the plaintiffs’ HCLCs was based,” and that the claim should 
have been dismissed for failure to serve an expert report.145 
“Yevgeniya Kumets was admitted to Trinity Care Center (Trinity) nursing 
home to recover from a stroke.”146 Kumets’s family members filed suit against 
Trinity alleging that Kumets received inadequate care at Trinity, which “caused 
her to suffer a second stroke.”147 They also alleged that Trinity discharged 
Kumets from the nursing home in retaliation for complaints her family made 
about her care.148 As required by Chapter 74 for health care liability claims, the 
Kumetses filed an expert report.149 However, after granting an extension to cure 
the expert report of any deficiencies, the trial court held that the expert report 
was still deficient and “dismiss[ed] all of their claims except for the retaliation 
claim.”150 “Trinity appealed the court’s order, arguing that the retaliation claim 
was also an HCLC that must be dismissed.”151 A divided court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that “an HCLC must involve injury to or death of the 
claimant’” and that “claims asserting pure economic loss[,]” like that of the 
wrongful discharge from the nursing facility, “do not meet this element of the 
definition.”152 “[T]he dissent noted that . . . claims that are based on the same 
facts as HCLC [claims] are themselves HCLCs and must be dismissed absent a 
sufficient expert report.”153 
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the dissent and reiterated that a 
plaintiff cannot “circumvent [the Texas Medical Liability Act’s] procedural 
requirements by claim-splitting or by any form of artful pleading.”154 Rather, 
“[w]hen a plaintiff asserts a claim that is based on the same underlying facts as 
an HCLC that the plaintiff also asserts, both claims are HCLCs and must be 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 730–31. 
 144. PM Mgmt.–Trinity NC, L.L.C. v. Kumets, 404 S.W.3d 550, 550 (Tex. 2013). 
 145. Id. at 550–52. 
 146. Id. at 551. 
 147. Id. Among others, Plaintiffs asserted claims for medical negligence, negligence per se, gross 
negligence, and negligent hiring, supervision, management, and retention of employees. Id. 
 148. Id. at 550–51. The retaliation claim was brought under Texas Health & Safety Code § 
260A.015(a), “which creates a statutory cause of action against a nursing facility that retaliates or 
discriminates against a resident or family member who makes a complaint or files a grievance 
concerning the facility.” Id. at 551. 
 149. See id. at 551; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West 2013). 
 150. PM Mgmt., 404 S.W.3d at 551. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 552. 
 154. Id. (referencing Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192, 196 (Tex. 2010)). 
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dismissed if the plaintiff fails to produce a sufficient expert report.”155 “In 
support of their claim for breach of fiduciary duty, [Plaintiffs] asserted that 
Trinity retaliated against [Kumets] once complaints were made about her poor 
treatment. . . .”156 Notably, the plaintiffs did not challenge the trial court’s 
findings that their negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims were 
HCLCs.157 Thus, “because [the Kumetses’] retaliation claim was based on the 
same underlying facts [as one of the HCLCs], the trial court should have 
dismissed that claim as an HCLC . . .” in its order.158 
The Supreme Court pointed out that it was “not decid[ing] . . . that a claim 
for retaliation or discrimination under the Health & Safety Code is always an 
HCLC, or even that [Plaintiffs’] claim for breach of fiduciary duty was an 
HCLC.”159 But because the plaintiffs did not appeal those determinations by the 
trial court judge, the Supreme Court had to assume that the breach of fiduciary 
duty allegation was an HCLC for purposes of deciding the case.160 
These two cases are important because they offer guidance to both plaintiffs 
and defendants in the health care field. Although the Supreme Court continued 
to disagree over what constitutes an HCLC under the “safety” component of the 
statutory definition, it has consistently interpreted Chapter 74 to broadly 
encompass claims related in some way to the provision of health care, and thus, 
continues to require expert reports. Under this year’s and previous years’ 
holdings, it is important for a plaintiff to fully analyze whether any one of his or 
her asserted causes of action falls within the definition of an HCLC. If any claim 
possibly falls within the statutory definition, a prudent plaintiff would serve an 
expert report because failure to comply with these requirements comes with the 
harshest of consequences—dismissal with prejudice and an award of attorney’s 
fees for the defendant.161 
B.  AN EXPERT REPORT IS SUFFICIENT IF IT ADDRESSES AT LEAST ONE THEORY 
OF LIABILITY 
Despite continuing to include claims within the confines of Chapter 74, the 
Texas Supreme Court also issued an opinion easing a plaintiff’s expert report 
requirements. In Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, the Supreme Court resolved a 
conflict among the courts of appeals and held that an expert report that 
adequately addresses at least one pleaded liability theory satisfies the statutory 
requirements.162 
Cherie Potts filed suit alleging that one of her treating nurses at Christus St. 
Catherine’s Hospital had verbally and sexually assaulted her during her stay.163 
The nurse, Les Hardin, had been “referred to the hospital by a staffing service 
 
 155. Id. (referencing Yamada, 335 S.W.3d at 196). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 551. 
 158. Id. at 552. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a)–(b) (West 2013). 
 162. Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625, 627–31 (Tex. 2013). 
 163. Id. at 626. 
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owned by Certified EMS.”164 In her petition, Potts claimed “that Certified EMS 
was vicariously liable [for Hardin’s actions] under the theory of respondeat 
superior,” as well as “directly liable for [his] conduct because [Certified EMS] 
failed to properly train and oversee its staff, enforce applicable standards of care, 
and employ protocols to ensure quality patient care and adequate staff 
supervision.”165 
As required for HCLCs by Chapter 74, Potts timely served each defendant 
with expert reports.166 “Certified EMS challenged the reports, and the trial court 
gave Potts thirty days to cure the alleged deficiencies.”167 In addition to serving 
an additional expert report, Potts supplemented an original expert report in 
which her expert “outline[d] the appropriate standard of care for nurses and 
nursing agencies, describe[d] the actions that should have been taken by Hardin 
and Certified EMS to prevent assaults, and conclude[d] that [both] Hardin’s and 
Certified EMS’s failures caused Potts’s injuries.”168 Certified EMS moved to 
dismiss the case, arguing that the reports failed to include “any explicit reference 
to Certified EMS’s direct liability for Hardin’s conduct.”169 “The trial court 
denied the motion” and “the court of appeals affirmed, holding . . . that if the 
claimant timely serves an expert report that adequately addresses at least one 
liability theory against a defendant health care provider, the suit can proceed. . . 
.”170 
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals’ holding but 
disagreed with its reasoning.171 The Supreme Court initially noted that the split 
in the appellate courts was largely due to varying interpretations of the 
definition of “cause of action.”172 The Texas Supreme Court “decline[d] to 
follow that approach” and instead looked to the statutory language, legislative 
intent, and practicalities of efficient litigation to reach its conclusion.173 
First, the Supreme Court noted that “[n]o provision of the [Texas Medical 
Liability] Act requires an expert report to address each alleged liability theory[;]” 
the statute only “requires a claimant to file an expert report ‘[i]n a health care 
liability claim.’”174 The purpose of the report is to (1) “inform the defendant of 
the specific conduct the plaintiff has called into question[,]” and (2) “provide a 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 626−27.  
 166. Id. at 627. 
 167. Id. Section 74.351(c) allows the court to grant the claimant one 30-day extension to cure a 
deficient expert report. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(c) (West 2013). 
 168. Certified EMS, Inc., 392 S.W.3d at 627. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 171. Id. at 628–30, 632–33. 
 172. See id. at 630. Chapter 74 requires that an expert report be served “[i]n a health care 
liability claim,” which Chapter 74 further defines as “a cause of action against a health care 
provider or physician . . . .” Id. at 630; TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West 
2011). 
 173. See Certified EMS, Inc., 392 S.W.3d at 630–32. Several courts of appeals were split on 
whether different theories of liability must be based on different sets of operative facts. See id. at 
627–30. The Supreme Court pointed out “the pitfalls of this approach[,]” noting that one can 
reach different conclusions on whether the “operative facts” underlying a claim for vicarious 
liability differ from those facts underlying a claim for direct liability. Id. at 630. 
 174. Id. at 630 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West 2013)). 
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basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit.”175 “A report 
need not cover every alleged liability theory” to satisfy this purpose.176 
Requiring the claimant to address only one theory of liability is also 
consistent with the Legislature’s intent “to reduce the excessive frequency and 
severity of . . . claims, but . . . in a manner that will not unduly restrict a 
claimant’s rights. . . . ”177 Thus, “[t]he expert report . . . is a threshold 
mechanism” “to deter frivolous claims, not to” “address weak subsets to those 
claims” or “to dispose of claims regardless of their merits.”178 An expert report 
that supports “at least one viable liability theory” indicates the health care 
liability claim is not frivolous.179 Furthermore, courts should not be burdened 
with determining the merits of every theory at the outset of the case—this 
approach would entangle the courts and result in delays.180 Rather, claimants 
can refine their claims through amended petitions after discovery reveals more 
facts; “[s]ummary judgment motions permit trial courts to dispose of claims that 
lack evidentiary support.”181 The Supreme Court concluded that “an expert 
report that adequately addresses at least one pleaded liability theory satisfies the 
statutory requirements,” and the case may proceed.182 
While the Supreme Court’s decision seems to set forth a bright line rule, it 
will be interesting to see how its holding plays out in cases with multiple 
defendants and multiple theories of liability as to each defendant. One can 
imagine a case in which a plaintiff sues multiple physicians and facilities alleging 
that each negligently caused his or her injury in different ways based on different 
sets of discrete facts. How many theories of liability must be covered in the 
initial expert report? We will likely see over the next few years how plaintiffs, 
defendants, and the lower courts interpret the Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts 
holding. 
C.  SERVICE OF THE EXPERT REPORT: WHEN AND BY WHAT METHOD? 
Prior to September 1, 2013, section 74.351(a) stated that “a claimant shall, 
not later than the 120th day after the date the original petition was filed, serve 
on each party or the party’s attorney one or more expert reports . . . .”183 Over 
 
 175. Id. (referencing Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 879 
(Tex. 2001)). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 631. 
 178. Id. (citing Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2011)). 
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 181. Id. at 632. 
 182. Id. The Supreme Court went on to clarify its holding in Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc., 274 
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 183. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West 2005). As discussed below, the 
Legislature amended Section 74.351 effective September 1, 2013. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West 2013). The Supreme Court in Zanchi v. Lane was interpreting the 
statute for cases filed prior to September 1, 2013. See Zanchi v. Lane, 408 S.W.3d 373, 375 (Tex. 
2013); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West 2005). 
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the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court held that “serving [an expert] 
report on a defendant who has not yet been served with process” complies with 
these statutory requirements.184 
“On April 21, 2010, Reginald Keith Lane . . . filed suit . . . against 
anesthesiologist Michael A. Zanchi, M.D., alleging Zanchi’s medical negligence 
resulted in [Juameka] Ross’s death.”185 “Zanchi was not served with process until 
September 16, 2010[,]” well after the 120-day deadline for serving an expert 
report.186 However, on August 19, 2010, the deadline for serving an expert 
report, Lane sent the required report and curriculum vitae to five different 
locations via certified mail.187 Four of the mailings were returned unclaimed, but 
the mailing sent to the hospital where Zanchi worked was signed for.188 Zanchi 
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming that Lane failed to 
timely serve the expert report as required by Chapter 74 because Zanchi was not 
a “party” to the suit until after he was served with process.189 Thus, Zanchi 
argued, any transmittal of the report prior to service did not meet the statutory 
requirements.190 
Applying the rules of statutory construction, the Supreme Court noted that 
the term “party” is not defined in the Texas Medical Liability Act, and thus, its 
common law meaning controls.191 Although the Supreme Court “ha[d] never 
directly addressed the meaning of the term ‘party’ in [this specific] context[,]” it 
found that in other contexts it had recognized that one can be a “party” to a case 
before being served with process.192 The Supreme Court had previously stated in 
Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc. that “because [a health care provider] was named in 
the original petition as a party to this suit, the [claimants] were required to serve 
it with a report before the statutory period expired. . . .”193 This statement, said 
the Supreme Court, “indicate[s] that one becomes a ‘party’ to a [health care 
liability claim] when [he or she is] named in the lawsuit.”194 
In the expert report context, interpreting “party” to include those persons 
named but not yet served best effectuates the purpose of the expert report 
requirement while preventing prejudice to the defendant.195 Receiving the 
expert report before being served with process “gives the defendant advance 
 
 184. Zanchi, 408 S.W.3d at 375. 
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 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 378−79. 
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notice of the pending lawsuit and the alleged conduct at issue.”196 It also allows 
the plaintiff to avoid claim dismissal under subsection 74.351(b) when he or she 
cannot effectuate service within 120 days of filing the petition.197 Furthermore, 
interpreting “party” to mean one named in a lawsuit “is consistent with 
dictionary definitions of the term as well as the Texas Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”198 
The Texas Supreme Court went on to address some ancillary issues raised in 
the case itself and by its own interpretation.199 As to the Chapter 74 provision 
that requires a defendant to file and serve any objections to the sufficiency of the 
expert report within twenty-one days, the Supreme Court held that the provision 
is not implicated until the defendant is served with process and has an 
obligation to join in the litigation proceedings.200 Additionally, the Supreme 
Court held that service of an expert report on a party not yet served with process 
does not have to comply with the service-of-citation requirements set forth in 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106.201 Thus, service of the report in a manner 
consistent with Rule 21a will satisfy the Chapter 74 requirements.202 
Justice Hecht concurred with the majority’s holding but wrote separately to 
express his concern with its interpretation of “party.”203 Justice Hecht felt that 
the holding should have been predicated solely on furthering the Legislature’s 
purpose behind the expert report requirement, not on the meaning of the term 
“party” in the abstract.204 Quoting Justice Carter from the court of appeals, 
Justice Hecht noted, 
The Legislature determined that expert reports must be filed in order to 
avoid costly, unnecessary, and unmerited legal proceedings, but 
unfortunately, in this case, that goal has not been accomplished. . . . 
Instead of engaging in expensive and time-consuming trial and appellate 
litigation attempting to establish that the simple words “party” and “serve” 
have abstruse meanings, these parties should be preparing for and trying 
their case.205 
It appears that the legislature took note of Justices Hecht and Carter’s 
concerns; during the last legislative session, it amended section 74.351.206 
Effective September 1, 2013, the 120-day expert report deadline will begin to 
run from the date on which the defendant’s answer is filed, rather than from the 
date on which the petition is filed.207 Additionally, the defendant’s 21-day 
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deadline to object to the report does not begin to run until the later of: the date 
the report is served or the date the defendant’s answer is filed.208 Thus, cases 
filed after September 1, 2013, will avoid timing conflicts between service of 
citation and service of the expert report. 
III.  DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY 
A.  ATTORNEY’S FEES IN DISCLOSURE-ONLY MERGER CLASS ACTION 
SETTLEMENTS 
The vast majority of mergers are challenged by shareholders in litigation.209 
Most cases settle, and when they settle, most of the time the only relief to 
shareholders is additional disclosures paired with a fee award to plaintiff 
attorneys.210 In March 2013, the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth 
District effectively foreclosed this practice in Texas by holding in Kazman v. 
Frontier Oil Corp. that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(i)(2) prohibited the 
award of cash fees to class counsel where the settlement class received only 
additional disclosures regarding a merger.211 Rule 42(i)(2) provides: “If any 
portion of the benefits recovered for the class are in the form of coupons or other 
noncash common benefits, the attorney fees awarded in the action must be in cash 
and noncash amounts in the same proportion as the recovery for the class.”212 The 
appellant in Kazman argued that under the plain meaning of Rule 42(i)(2), 
“[T]here can be no cash compensation for class counsel because class counsel 
negotiated no cash benefits for the class.”213 
The Dallas Court of Appeals previously considered the meaning of Rule 
42(i)(2) in Rocker v. Centex Corp.214 There, the court likewise concluded that Rule 
42(i)(2) prohibited recovery of cash attorney’s fees where there was no cash 
recovery for the class but remanded the matter “in the interest of justice” 
because it was a matter of first impression.215 In doing so, the court suggested 
that the trial court might consider an equitable award of attorney’s fees based on 
the value of noncash benefits recovered for the class.216 The parties in Rocker 
subsequently reached a settlement agreement after the Texas Supreme Court 
had granted petition for review, and the Texas Supreme Court set aside the 
judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment 
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without considering the merits, pursuant to the settlement.217 Rocker thus left 
some ambiguity as to whether a trial court could award attorney’s fees under an 
equitable theory, Rule 42(i)(2) notwithstanding.218 
Kazman, however, resolved this ambiguity by affirming the trial court’s 
judgment approving the settlement agreement but modifying the judgment to 
excise the attorney’s fees award altogether.219 To the appellee’s request that the 
court remand the case to consider an equitable award of fees, the court replied, 
“Rule 42(i)(2) . . . prohibit[s] awarding attorney’s fees in cash to class counsel, 
regardless of the value of the benefit to the class[,]” and therefore “remand . . . 
would be futile.”220 
The court noted that its modification of the judgment was made possible 
partially because the settlement agreement provided for severability of the 
attorney’s fees award, specifically: “Court approval and consummation of the 
Settlement shall not in any way be conditioned on Court approval of Plaintiffs’ 
counsel’s fees.”221 In the future, a plaintiff’s counsel hoping to avoid the effect of 
Rule 42(i)(2) may attempt to expressly condition operation of the settlement 
agreement on court approval of attorney’s fees, but such a provision may do 
nothing in and of itself to justify a fee award in light of the rule. 
To the extent Texas courts follow Kazman, a class action settlement of a 
merger contest will have to include some monetary relief to the class in order to 
warrant approval of cash attorney’s fees. But a plaintiff’s counsel may still be 
unable to recover significant fees if a settlement simply includes a nominal cash 
sum along with disclosures. Rule 42(i)(2) requires that cash attorney’s fees be in 
the same proportion as cash to noncash recovery for the class.222 So if the bulk 
of the class’s relief consists of disclosures with a nominal cash kicker, Rule 
42(i)(2) would limit recovery of attorney’s fees proportionally to that nominal 
amount.223 How Texas courts might make such a determination remains to be 
seen. 
Therefore, application of Rule 42(i)(2) will likely have a chilling effect on 
lawsuits for nonmonetary relief in Texas, including those for disclosure-based 
merger contests but also for declaratory judgment actions and suits to enjoin 
environmental pollution that do not also seek monetary relief.224 
B.  ONE SATISFACTION AND FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS 
When can a plaintiff seek separate damages for alternative theories of 
liability? Under the one-satisfaction rule, parties can seek separate damages on 
alternative theories when “the theories depend on separate and distinct injuries 
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and . . . separate and distinct damages findings are made as to each theory.”225 
During the Survey period, the First District Court of Appeals in Houston 
reviewed this issue in the context of a shareholder suit alleging breach of 
fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims, ultimately concluding that the 
plaintiff had, in part, failed to justify two separate damages awards.226 
In Saden v. Smith, plaintiff Brian Smith sued his business partner Charles 
Saden for diverting business from their jointly-owned company to Saden’s 
personal bank account and to his competing separate business.227 Smith alleged 
separate claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty—the contract 
claim based on the corporate governance documents of their partnership, and 
the fiduciary duty claim based on Saden’s duties to the company.228 
The jury answered three separate damages questions and “awarded damages 
in the following amounts: (1) $941,907 for breach of contract, (2) $393,093 for 
breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) $941,907 for [the amount of] Saden’s profit 
from the conduct found to be a breach of his fiduciary duties.”229 The trial court 
rendered judgment for these amounts (plus attorney’s fees and interest), 
including both the $941,907 for breach of contract and the additional $941,907 
for “equitable disgorgement of profits” from breach of fiduciary duty.230 
Saden appealed, arguing that Smith’s recovery violated the one-satisfaction 
rule because all of the damages derived from the same conduct.231 The court of 
appeals agreed, to a point, finding that “Smith made no attempt in the trial 
court to distinguish between the damages he suffered as a result of Saden’s 
breach of contract and his breach of fiduciary duty[,]” and that “Smith presented 
a unified damages model through the testimony of [his accounting expert.]”232 
As such, the court found that the one-satisfaction rule barred Smith from 
recovering lost profits for both breach of contract ($941,907) and breach of 
fiduciary duty ($393,093) but held that Smith could nevertheless recover for 
equitable disgorgement of profits arising from breach of fiduciary duty (the other 
$941,907).233 
The court reasoned that as to lost profits damages, there was “significant 
overlap” in the allegations regarding breach of contract and breach of fiduciary 
duty, and no competent evidence allowed a fact finder to separately attribute lost 
profits damages only to one theory of liability or the other.234 As to equitable 
disgorgement, however, the court found “that it serves a separate function of 
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protecting fiduciary relationships.”235 As such, the court found that the one-
satisfaction rule did not bar recovery for both breach of contract lost profits and 
breach of fiduciary duty disgorgement of profits because “these remedies are 
intended to address separate and distinct injuries.”236 Notably, the dissenting 
opinion would have permitted recovery for all three damages categories.237 
This result seems counterintuitive because Smith’s identical damages awards 
coupled with his failure to distinguish between theories of liability as to damages 
would seem to fit squarely within the one-satisfaction rule. But because equitable 
disgorgement serves as a distinct remedy protecting fiduciary relationships, 
defense counsel should be wary whenever a breach of fiduciary duty claim is 
submitted to the jury and should give due attention to the jury charge. Likewise, 
a plaintiff’s counsel seeking recovery on multiple theories of liability, including 
breach of fiduciary duty, would do well to try and include equitable 
disgorgement questions in the jury charge, thereby potentially expanding the 
range of recovery. 
C.  MINORITY SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION IN L.L.C.S 
The development of minority shareholder oppression claims in Texas has 
been a hot issue in the past several years. During the Survey period, the El Paso 
Court of Appeals added to the discussion in Kohannim v. Katoli, which looked at 
the application of minority shareholder oppression claims in the context of 
limited liability companies.238 The concept of minority shareholder oppression 
derives in part from Texas Business Organizations Code § 11.404, which 
provides for the “appoint[ment of] a receiver for the entity’s property and 
business if[,]” among other things, “the actions of the governing persons are 
illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent[.]”239 Because a receiver may only be appointed 
if “the court determines that all other available legal and equitable remedies . . . 
are inadequate[,]”240 courts have extrapolated that they may grant other 
equitable remedies besides receivership.241 
In Kohannim, plaintiff Katoli received a 50% interest in 360 Center, L.L.C., 
in the divorce from her husband, who had been a member of 360 Center and 
the original holder of the 50% interest.242 The other 50% interest was held by 
defendant Kohannim, who became the sole manager and member of 360 
Center by operation of its L.L.C. agreement subsequent to the transfer of the 
50% interest to Katoli.243 Katoli sued Kohannim under a number of theories—
including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and shareholder oppression, among 
others—on the basis that Kohannim had mismanaged 360 Center to her 
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detriment.244 “The trial court appointed a receiver for 360 Center,” which 
liquidated 360 Center’s assets, and the trial court ultimately valued those assets 
at $1,445,969.26.245 After a bench trial, Katoli was awarded: (1) $722,984.63, 
representing her “50% beneficial interest in the assets[;]” (2) $418,761.06, 
representing the difference between Katoli’s actual 50% interest in 360 Center 
and the value it would have been absent Kohannim’s “wrongful acts and 
admissions[;]” and (3) punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and “conditional awards 
in the event of appeal.”246 
Although the opinion of the court of appeals deals with a number of 
interesting issues relating to the minority shareholder oppression theory of 
liability,247 this note focuses on the question of whether the equitable remedies 
available for oppression claims include the award of damages above 50% of the 
value of 360 Center. The court of appeals invalidated all of Katoli’s theories of 
liability except for minority shareholder oppression, meaning that for it to affirm 
the damages award, as it did (except as to punitive damages), the court had to 
find that it was a proper form of equitable relief.248 
Relying on broad language in other cases, the court found that equitable relief 
for minority shareholder oppression “is not limited to a recovery of [the 
shareholder’s] proportionate share of the sale proceeds” but rather can include 
“‘tailoring the remedy to fit the particular case.’”249 In Ritchie v. Rupe, for 
instance, the court acknowledged that “buyout” may be an available remedy for 
minority shareholder oppression, consisting of “order[ing] the majority 
shareholder and the corporation to buy out the plaintiff’s interest in the 
corporation at the value found by the jury.”250 But this begs the question of 
whether such remedies are available “only if . . . all other available legal and 
equitable remedies . . . are inadequate.”251 
Indeed, in another minority shareholder oppression case involving an L.L.C., 
the court of appeals suggested that “there is little necessity for [a shareholder 
oppression] cause of action when the minority shareholder has non-disclosure 
and fiduciary duty claims.”252 Kohannim does not appear to make any such 
determination regarding the adequacy of other remedies.253 It did, however, 
dismiss Katoli’s other theories of recovery, including her breach of fiduciary duty 
claim on the basis that she failed to secure findings on essential elements of the 
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claim.254 
The Texas Supreme Court has the opportunity to clarify some of the issues 
surrounding oppression liability in Ritchie255 and ARGO Data Resource Corp. v. 
Shagrithaya,256 but it may also take up Kohannim for the opportunity to look at 
the issue of how courts should determine the kind of equitable relief available 
for minority shareholder oppression claims.257 Should “buyout” relief be 
available when plaintiffs have brought breach of fiduciary duty claims, but failed 
to prove them, as in Kohannim? Should courts undertake an analysis of whether 
plaintiffs have other available legal remedies before resorting to equitable relief 
for minority shareholder oppression? Should such relief be narrowly tailored in 
the first case, or may courts choose from the wide net of possibilities at their 
discretion? Look for answers to these questions and more in the upcoming 
Texas Supreme Court decisions on minority shareholder oppression. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The cases discussed above raise new and important issues for professional 
liability of all types, whether it involves lawyers, medical providers, or directors 
and officers. Texas courts continue to refine claims in the area of professional 
liability, and it will be interesting to see whether the Texas Supreme Court 
agrees with the decisions produced by the lower courts during the Survey period. 
This area of the law is constantly evolving, and attorneys that practice on both 
sides of the docket should constantly monitor new developments that may 
facilitate or impede their claims. 
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